That the "war on terror" is a matter of situational ethics cannot be more clearly demonstrated than by the decision of the US State Department yesterday to remove the Marxist-Islamist death and murder cult, Mujahedeen Khalq (MeK), from the US terror list.
As Glenn Greenwald pointed out earlier this year, the MeK is jointly funded and trained by Israeli and US intelligence to carry out murder and mayhem inside Iran against civilian targets. It is the murderous and violent vanguard of the US and Israeli war against Iran. It launders money fromIsrael and the US through US politicians who on one side of their mouths scream about the need to fight terrorism while on the other they accept millions to lobby for one of the most brutal and bizarre terrorist cults on earth.
Many do not realize that the MeK was not always opposed to those currently ruling Iran and their revolutionary forebears. In fact they fought alongside the current regime to overthrow the Shah and seize the US embassy in Tehran. As often happens with revolutions, the MeK was formed after a falling out among the revolutionaries. In many ways they have become more fanatical than the group who eventually took charge in Iran. It appears the only arrow in Washington's foreign policy quiver is to support the most radical and extremist elements in hopes they will overthrow the "bad guys" and not afterwards turn against us. Ambassador Stevens's untimely end is just one recent bit of evidence of the success of that strategy.
How are politicians who promote the MeK — paid handsomely or not — not "providing material support for terrorism"? Perhaps they should be subject to some of the laws they pass on the matter. I wonder how many MeK backers voted for NDAA...
For more background, please see this excellent piece by my favorite Iran-watchers, Leverett & Leverett.
See this from the Leveretts piece:
"...once the MEK is formally off the FTO list—a legally defined process that will take a few months to play out—Congress will be appropriating money to support the monafeqin as the vanguard of a new American strategy for regime change in Iran. In the 1990s, similar enthusiasm for Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress—who were about as unpopular among Iraqis as the MEK is among Iranians—led to President Clinton’s signing of the Iraq Liberation Act, which paved the way for George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The chances for such a scenario to play out with regard to Iran over the next few years—with even more disastrous consequences for America’s strategic and moral standing—got a lot higher today."